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WORLD BANK STRATEGY FOR 2005‐2008 ‐ ASSISTANCE FOR CROATIA 
The World Bank is ready to loan to Croatia 1,5 billion dollars to assist the country to achieve reforms, 
which are essential to the EU membership. Until 2008 it lends 1 billion dollar in all, and if the 
transformation comes off according to plan, this amount will be completed with further 0,5 billion $. 
The objective is to enhance the country’s competitiveness and the economy’s achievement and help 
Croatia to harmonise its national laws to EU standards. 
In Albert Martinez’s opinion (the croation delegate of the World Bank) this is an important turn in the 
loan-policy of the financial institute as well, because till now they favour particularly single investment 
programmes, but in the future the main aim will be the transformation of the economic framework.  
Croatia joined the World Bank and the International Development Association in 1993. Since then, the 
Bank has played an important role in providing financing, technical advice and knowledge transfer. Its 
assistance has focused on helping Croatia with the reconstruction after war, improving welfare and 
reviving the development in the country. 
The basis of the World Bank’s activities in Croatia is Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), sets forth in 
consultations with the Government, which works out the assistance of the Bank in a three-year period. 
The last period of 1999-2003 includes 3 standard types of project financing: loans, grants and 
analytical and advisory activities.  
In Zagreb on 19th January 2005 the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the World Bank 
launched the new CAS for the period 2005-2008. This CAS focused on assisting the Government of 
Croatia in: 
▪ improving macroeconomic sustainability through more efficient public spending, together with 
strengthened budget management; 
▪ achieving sustainable private sector-led growth through enforcement of financial discipline and 
competitive conditions in the enterprise sector; 
▪ ensuring broad participation in growth through transformation of the education system, 
improved targeting and delivery of health care and social benefits; 
▪ facilitating sustainable natural resource management through  strengthening of environmental 
management capacity, upgrading of wastewater and water supply infrastructure and improved 
energy efficiency. 
The measure of the economic growth in Croatia was powerful in the last few years due to the 
accession of the large infrastructural investments and domestic consumption. By the statistic the real 
Gross Domestic Product for the third quarter of 2004 is by 3,6% higher than in the same period of the 
year 2003, and the annual GDP for the year 2003 showed an increase of 4,3%, as compared to the 
year 2002. 
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TABLE 1. 
MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CROATIA (2000-2004) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GDP, market prices (kuna) n.d. 165.639,4 176.428,8 189.883 
GDP per capita, USD n.d. 4.476,2 5.049,5 6.377,4 
Annual growth rates (%), constant prices (1997) n.d. 4,4 5,2 4,3 
Exports – recalculated in USD, year t/year (t-1) n.d. 105,3 105,1 125,7 
Imports – recalculated in USD, year t/year (t-1) n.d. 116 117,2 132,4 
Personal consumption – total (kuna) 58.613 61.141 64.736 n.d. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistic – Republic of Croatia 
In 2004 the monetary policy turned tighter, and it limited the consumption of the households and the 
public sector investments. The fact, that this year the GDP growth rates reached „just” approximately 
3,8 percent shows that the way which assured the economic growth in Croatia is not sustainable in 
long-term. The economic recovery in the last years has been accompained by a growing external 
current account deficit, which has been financed primarily by a sharp rise in external debt. 
But it is good news for Croatia that in the first ten months of 2004 the exports grew by 15,5%, while 
the imports showed a lower rate with 7% and the measure of the external debt fell last year as well. 
Debt sustainability analysis shows that the deficit is not exceeding 3 percent of GDP in normal 
circumstances, and the ratio of public debt to GDP is not exceeding 60 percent, so these indicators 
are meeting the Maastricht criteria required for the European Monetary Union by now.  
These data are essentially important for the country, which is standing before a great step. But they 
are not sufficient, they have to be stabilized for long-term, because Croatia have to focus on long-
term. It has become an official candidate country of the EU since 2004, and now the main strategic 
objective of the Croatian Government is the successful accession to the EU, to enter as a dynamic 
and competitive economy. To achieve these objectives, the CAS program relies on fiscal adjustment 
to stabilize the debt-to-GDP rates and structural reforms to reduce the economic role of the state and 
promote private sector activity. 
To become a successful member of the EU, Croatia will need to create conditions that will attract 
investment and induce growth. These conditions can be categorized as: 
▪ macroeconomic and financial stability; 
▪ stabil, progressive and predictable laws and institutions; 
▪ efficient labor and financial markets; 
▪ social and environmental sustainability; 
▪ effective integration into the European infrastructure networks ensuring competitive cost and 
quality, and 
▪ a dynamic business-oriented environment. 
The key to Croatia’s sustainable economic growth is the dominance of the private sector. There is a 
need to reduce public sector wage bill and subsidies. Principally the reducing and  restructuring of 
public spending, perfection the business climate and reforms of the judicial system are needed to 
increase private sector investment and productivity.  
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The main objective of the CAS is to support the government’s growth and reform strategy for 
successful EU accession. The strategy calls for a shift in the sources of growth from the public sector 
expenditures and consumption to private sector investments and efficiency. The greatest amount from 
the assistance of the World Bank (450 million USD) is intended to appropriate investments, the 
confirmation of the budget, and for finance the improvement of the efficiency of the public 
administration.  
In addition, the CAS is proposed to assist Croatia in those efforts that have to be made in the next 4 
years to meet EU accession requirements. This means that the CAS supports harmonization initiatives 
required by the acquis communautaire and enhances Croatia’s ability to tackle with competitive 
pressures in the EU. 
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RECORD BUDGET REVENUES IN BULGARIA IN 2004 – AN ESTIMATED 
SURPLUS OF THE BUDGET AGAIN 
In Bulgaria, the cash balance of the central government budget went on improving for the last months 
of 2004 in row. The consolidated budget revenues and expenditures in November amounted to BGN 
1,326.4 mn and 1,323.7 mn, which were by 22.4 % and 14.5 % bigger amounts, respectively. The 
cash surplus in the eleven months to December amounted to BGN 1,478 mn, growing by 65 %, 
compared to the same period of 2003. The surplus makes up about 0.7 % of the GDP. The cash 
balance of the budget in the eleven months to December reached BGN 1,256.6 mn, running 71 % 
higher on a year earlier. It was a very important fact that the primary and domestic balance improved 
significantly. They amounted to BGN 1,926.3 and 1,748 mn vs. 1,430.7 and 1,269.8 mn respectively, 
relative to the same period of 2003.  
The improving budget performance was mainly due to the robust growth in revenues, which last 
December ran at BGN 841.5 mn, or 32.92 % up on a year earlier. Since January 2004, budget 
revenues amounted to BGN 9,276 mn, reporting a year-on-year increase of 11.6 %. The revenues 
collected grew by 2.5 % on the 2004 budget projections. 
On the revenue side, the budgetary improvement was resulted in by differently increasing revenues. 
Tax revenues grew most vigorously. They had a 12-month increase of 38.4 %. At the same time, non-
tax revenues remained almost unchanged, growing by a bare 0.8 %. Of all items, it was revenues from 
VAT and the income tax that posted the highest growth of BGN 89.7 and 69.3 mn. However, it should 
be noted that the rise in income tax revenues was triggered by the alterations in the administration 
patterns of the tax item between the central budget and local governments. Indirect tax revenues 
increased, too. Revenues from excise duties grew by BGN 40.8 mn and from customs duties by BGN 
9.4 mn due mostly to the robust increase in imports. At the same time, profit tax revenues declined by 
BGN 6.8 mn, or 13.9 %, as a result of the tax rate reduced in early 2004. 
In spite of the robust growth in revenues the government pursued a rather cautious expenditure policy. 
For example, the central government expenditures in November amounted to BGN 770.4 mn, which 
was by only 2.4 % more than a year earlier. Capital expenditures and budget spending on 
maintenance reported the highest increase. Interest payments went up by BGN 6.6 mn (about 42.3 %) 
due mostly to the larger volumes of government securities placed on the domestic market as part of 
the debt restructuring exercise. At the same time, budgetary transfers declined by BGN 27.2 mn or 
10.44 %.  
In 2004, the public debt has further declined rapidly, due to the general government budget surplus, 
low interest rates, some use of the fiscal reserve and a strong exchange rate. General government 
debt is estimated to have closed 2004 equivalent to slightly below 40% of GDP. Rapid growth of the 
fiscal reserve due to privatisation successes is allowing the government to carry out buy-backs of its 
outstanding Brady debt. The general government debt is expected to fall to 32% of GDP at end-2005, 
in part reflecting the late January Brady debt retirement. This would mark a fall in general government 
debt of over 40% of GDP in six years, one of the fastest paces of sovereign debt reduction.  
The last weeks of 2004 already marked the start of the election season in Bulgaria, as the government 
raised expenditure sharply. The election is to be held in June 2005. More fiscal loosening ahead of the 
elections can be expected in the coming months but it probably will not threaten the sustainability of 
the public finances of the country. It can be forecasted that the general government budget will close 
the year 2005 at a deficit of around 1% of GDP compared with an official 0.5% of GDP deficit target. 
While fiscal discipline will suffer somewhat due to the elections, policy direction is unlikely to change 
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much under a future government given cross-party commitment to the currency board arrangement 
and EU accession 
Concerning the future trends, fiscal expansion could exacerbate Bulgaria's sizeable current account 
deficit in 2005, which narrowed slightly in 2004 but remained a sizeable 7.7 % of GDP. Even a 
worthening ratio is well above the median current account deficit for all countries rated at the 'BBB' 
level and above those of other 'second wave' EU accession countries such as Croatia, Romania and 
Turkey.  
While the large current account deficit highlights problems such as low domestic savings rates, there 
is little sign that it is unsustainable. Foreign direct investment covers a large share of the deficit, and 
while debt inflows have risen sharply in nominal terms, the country's external debt ratios continue to 
moderate. Capital flows to Bulgaria should remain underpinned by continued privatisation, policy 
discipline, and the country's accession to the EU expected in January 2007. 
TABLE 2 
BALANCE OF THE BUDGET (IN MILLIONS OF BGN) 
Annual data 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 20041 
Consolidated budget revenues 
(accumulated) 11 062.0  11 837.4  12 523.3  14 072.0  15 800.0
Consolidated budget expenditures 
(accumulated) 11 330.7  12 096.6  12 732.7  14 071.1  14 544.4
Cash balance (accumulated) -268.6  -259.1  -209.5  0.9  1 256.6
Internal government debt (annual 
average) 2.336,4  1.765,5  1.976,9  2.223,2  2.650,0
External government debt (annual 
average) 18.920,7  18.979,1  17.481,0  15.109,1  13.100,0
 
Monthly data of 2004 
 January February March April May June 
Consolidated budget revenues 
(accumulated) 1.126,0 2,110.62 3,636.80 5.097,6 6.375,55 7.646,90 
Consolidated budget expenditures 
(accumulated) 1.152,7 2.260,16 3.408,40 4.568,7 5.665,80 6.769,30 
Cash balance (accumulated) -26,7 -149,55 228,40 528,9 709,75 877,60 
Internal government debt  2.347,4 2.414,08 2.442,20 2.462,4 2.475,30 2.494,47 
External government debt 14.588,1 14.577,39 14.729,40 14.874,3 14.712,30 14.704,32 
 July August September October November December
Consolidated budget revenues 
(accumulated) 8.996,50 10.311,38 11.622,09 12.978,15 14.304,55 15.800,0
Consolidated budget expenditures 
(accumulated) 8.019,80 9.119,70 10.322,35 11.502,85 12.826,55 14.544,6
Cash balance (accumulated) 976,70 1.191,68 1.299,74 1.475,30 1.478,00 1.256,6
Internal government debt  2.494,66 2.536,91 2.568,79 2.597,73 . . 
External government debt 13.595,2 13.531,8 13.485,4 13.329,7 . . 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Bulgaria Note: 1 estimations 
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MONTENEGRO – ECONOMIC POLICY FOCUSES ON PRIVATISATION 
FDI INFLOW 
FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) is considered to be a key instrument for increasing production, 
developing infrastructure and thus improving the standard of living. It is obvious that Montenegro 
would also like to have a share in these benefits, but in general we can state that Montenegro lags 
behind other countries - Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania – in the Southeast European region. This was 
the reason why the Montenegrin government had to make certain steps in 2004. For example foreign 
consultants were hired and an Agency for Investment Promotion was established. 
According to a recent FIAS (Foreign Investment Advisory Service) report, Montenegro’s main 
advantage is the good geographic location, the fast-paced economic reforms, the qualified but not so 
expensive workforce and last but not least the rapid privatization. On the other hand, Montenegro 
owns a small, low-revenue market, where the transition was relatively late. Other problems must be 
faced as well: structurally weak industries, macroeconomic instability, corruption and the deficiencies 
of the administrative system. 
Montenegro’s central bank reported USD 44 million net FDI inflow in the first nine months of 2004. 
This number represents 60 % increase in annual terms. 
CHART 1. 
NET FDI IN MONTENEGRO (JAN-SEP 2004, MILLION USD) 
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The Montenegrin government’s aim is to gear up FDI inflow to 150 million euro in 2005 by privatization 
campaigns, greenfield investments and other development projects. The deal that is expected to 
generate most revenues is the sale of Telekom Montenegro (Telekom Crne Gore AD, TCG). The 
maximum price for TCG has been offered by Matáv – Hungary’s leading telecom group. For TCG’s 
100 % stake Matáv offered 165 million euros, which means that the Montenegrin government’s plan 
for 2005 will be overachieved. 
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TELEKOM MONTENEGRO’S ACQUISITION 
The TCG Group consists of TCG and its three subsidiaries, Monet GSM, Montenegro Card and 
Internet CG. TCG - Montenegro's fixed-line operator - provides fixed-line services to around 191,000 
customers. At the end of 2003 the 100 % owned Monet GSM is the country's second largest mobile 
operator with around 190,000 users and a 43 % market share. The 85 % owned Internet CG has over 
70,000 dial-up users and a 90 % share of the market. TCG owns 51 % of Montenegro Card, a provider 
of public payphone services with a 60 % market share. 
The deal with TCG is Matáv’s second investment abroad after acquiring a controlling stake in 
Macedonian Maktel. The recent agreement with TCG is part of the Hungarian company’s mid-term 
strategy and embodies further growth opportunities. Moreover, the acquisition might help Matáv to 
stop the decrease of revenues and the loss of fixed-line subscribers. 
According to the agreement with TCG, Matáv will buy for 114 million euros 51,12 % of the shares from 
the Government of Montenegro and a further offer will be submitted for the minority stakeholders for 
the additional 48,88 % shares. The acquisition of TCG will temporarily increase the indebtedness of 
Matáv. The bid also included a plan to invest 67 million euros in TCG over the next five years. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is indisputable that Montenegro’s transition is proceeding and good results are demonstrated by the 
privatization of enterprises and banks, but certain problems must be faced. Experts emphasize that 
the administrative capacity to implement reforms is weak and the entrepreneurial culture needs further 
development. After the accomplishments of early transition, the government’s new task is to formulate 
a medium-term plan, a clear strategy to achieve deeper institutional and structural reforms. 
It seems that the Montenegrin government is trying to make efforts to attract sustained FDI inflows, 
including through large-scale privatization. Still urgent reforms are required in public sector 
administration and the judiciary system. All of these aim to boost private sector development and 
improve the investment climate. Attracting future FDI will be a challenge for Montenegro. 
In 2005 the economic policy should find solution in two main topics: fighting inflation in order to keep it 
below 10 % and reducing the current payment deficit. Plans have been laid with the help of IMF to 
achieve these goals. Due to the fact that the share of the private sector is still only 45 % in 
Montenegro, experts advise to accelerate privatisation. The forthcoming privatisation of aluminium 
company Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica (KAP) will eventually put the largest part of Montenegro’s 
economy in the hands of the private sector. 
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MACEDONIA – STATUS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONE YEAR AFTER 
APPLICATION 
At the beginning of 2004, Branko Crvenkovski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia, 
announced that his country would apply for European Union membership at the end of February. 
According to the Macedonian government, the opposition agreed with the EU application. The 
country’s European integration is their common and national interest, thus, this announcement 
seemed to be serious.  
The Parliament of Macedonia agreed on formally applying for EU membership in February 2004. 
However, the official application date (26 February) was delayed due to Macedonian President Boris 
Trajkovski’s tragic death in air crash. Almost one month later, on 22 March 2004, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia officially applied for EU membership. 
With this application, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) - became independent at 
the beginning of ‘90s – can be the fourth candidate country in the Southeast European region after 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. Bulgaria and Romania finished their pre-accession process at the end 
of 2004 and can be members in 20071, while Croatia applied for EU membership in early 2003. The 
EU welcomed Croatia’s application, the European Commission’s official statement on this issue was 
basically positive. According to the current roadmap, the accession negotiations with Croatia will start 
in March 2005. 
TABLE 3. 
MAIN ECONOMIC FIGURES OF MACEDONIA (1998-2004) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003* 2004** 
GDP growth (%) 3,4 4,3 4,6 -4,5 0,9 3,2 4,0 
Inflation rate (%) 0,8 -1,1 5,8 5,3 2,4 1,2 2,0 
Unemployment rate (%) 34,5 32,4 32,2 30,9 31,9 36,7 35,0 
General government balance (% of GDP) -1,7 0 1,8 -7,2 -5,6 -1,6 -2,0 
Current account balance (% of GDP) -7,5 -0,8 -2,1 -6,8 -8,5 -6,0 -7,7 
Net FDI (million euro) 105 30 191 498 82 83 120 
Source: IMF, NBRM, 
* Preliminary, ** Expectations 
BACKGROUND 
In contrast with Croatia’s application that of Macedonia was not really welcomed by the EU. As a 
matter of fact, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is now a much more “problematic” and 
less developed country than Croatia is. That is the reason why the application of Croatia was 
welcomed in 2003, while Javier Solana, the EU’s security chief recommended to Macedonia that 
Skopje should not rush its application for European Union membership. His reason for his statement 
was that the EU would be too engaged with the accession of the 10 new member states. It is obvious 
that the EU will have enough problems after the accession of these states and will not have enough 
resources to manage the application of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Thus, 
Macedonia cannot expect an early answer from the EU2. On the other hand, Solana’s statement – in 
                                                 
1 This is the target date.  
2  The case of Croatia is a good example: the Western Balkan country applied for EU membership at the 
beginning of 2003, and the EU  finished its official statement in one year.  
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our point of view - contains that the EU is still not prepared for the integration of the less developed 
Balkan countries like the Republic of Macedonia.  
The relations between the EU and Macedonia started in 1996 when Macedonia became eligible for 
funding under the EU PHARE program. Three years later, the EU proposed a so-called Stabilization 
and Association process (SAp) for five Western Balkan countries. In 2000, the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) was the result of the SAp which was signed and came into force in 
2001. In that year, another Agreement was signed that was the so-called Ohrid Agreement. These two 
agreements helped Macedonia to the stabilization and founded a country with peace.  
The application for EU membership was the next step in the European integration process of the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, the country faced  a big problem at this stage. 
Greece, the southern neighbour of FYROM stated that it would veto Macedonia’s entry into the EU if 
the country insists on being internationally recognised as the Republic of Macedonia. The row on the 
name flared again in late 2004 due to the fact that the United States announced that it had formally 
recognized the Republic of Macedonia as the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
The reason for Greece’s declaration is that they have fear of that the use of the Republic of 
Macedonia carries territorial claims on Greece’s northern province of the same historic name (which is 
the birthplace of the Macedonian King Alexander the Great). That is why Athens announced that it 
might veto Macedonia’s bid for EU membership.  
The US’ recognition was evaluated in three different ways in the three countries. Athens said that 
Washington’s decision was “a diplomatic stab against Greece”, and Bush was called as “the Godfather 
of Macedonia”. In Macedonia, the decision was evaluated as a victory, while in the US the decision it 
was explained as the sign of support for Macedonia’s government and rewards its commitments to 
democracy and war against terrorism. Probably, the solution could be that the two countries (Greece 
and Macedonia) will accept an agreed, mutually accepted name in the future. 
In October 2004, the EC sent its questionnaire to Macedonia on which the Commission will base its 
opinion. This EU questionnaire includes around 4000 questions and covers a total of 3000 issues. 
When the questions have been answered, the questionnaire will be sent back to the EC which will 
prepare its opinion on the application of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. According to 
officials in Skopje, the answers to the EU questionnaire will be sent back to Brussels on 14 February 
2005. In our expectations, the opinion will be prepared in late 2005.  
Undoubtedly, the case of Macedonia is a quite strong message to the other former Yugoslav states 
and Albania, which are making great efforts to implement reforms. The positive example of Macedonia 
(after that of Croatia) can be stimulating to these countries in the region. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is obvious that the application for EU membership is a reasonable step from 
Macedonia because it may help the further stabilisation and the country’s European integration. 
However, the application of Macedonia did not come in the right time because the EU faces its largest 
enlargement round when ten, mainly less-developed Central and Eastern European economies joined 
the Community. Thus, Macedonia could not expect an early reply to its application from the EU. 
Furthermore, the pre-accession negotiations of Bulgaria and Romania are completed and the first part 
of the roadmap of Croatia seems also be on track. So the Republic of Macedonia needs to be patient 
but its European integration rose onto a higher level by the application for EU membership. 
